University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
College of Education Publications

College of Education

8-10-1994

Education Policy Analysis Archives 02/11
Arizona State University
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/coedu_pub
Part of the Education Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Arizona State University and University of South Florida, "Education Policy Analysis Archives 02/11 " (1994). College of Education
Publications. Paper 140.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/coedu_pub/140

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Education at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in College
of Education Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Education Policy Analysis Archives
Volume 2 Number 11

August 10, 1994

ISSN 1068-2341

A peer-reviewed scholarly electronic journal.
Editor: Gene V Glass,Glass@ASU.EDU. College of Education,
Arizona State University,Tempe AZ 85287-2411
Copyright 1994, the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES.Permission is hereby granted to copy any article
provided that EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES is
credited and copies are not sold.

On Education and the Common Good:
A Reply to Coulson
John Covaleskie
Northern Michigan University
jcovales@nmu.edu
Abstract:
This response to Coulson's recent EPAA piece, "Human Life, Human Organizations, and
Education," argues that Coulson is wrong about "human nature," social life, and the effects of
unregulated capitalist markets. On these grounds, it is argued that his call to remove education
from the public sphere should be rejected. The point is that education is certainly beneficial to
individuals who receive it, but to think of education as purely a private and personal good
properly distributed through the market is seriously to misconstrue the meaning of education. We
should not care to be the sort of people who do so.
Before replying to the substance of Coulson's recent Education Policy Analysis Archives
paper (1994), it should be noted that the entire argument rests on a false, or at least questionable,
premise--one that Coulson neither makes explicit nor defends. He assumes that public schools
are failing, and that they are failing just because they are public. As both Berliner (1993) and
Bracey (1993) have shown, public education is not failing; it is doing better than ever. Further,
most people know this (Elam et al. 1993) and are quite satisfied with their own local school,
though the media have convinced them that schools in general are in trouble. This is not a claim
that schools are perfect, or even that they are good enough. There is no such thing as "good
enough," but that is a feature of the complexity, importance, and difficulty of the enterprise; it is
not a sign of school failure but of the nature of the world.
Setting aside that Coulson bases his argument more on myth about school performance
than on fact, the argument itself warrants that we reject his call for the privatization of education.
He wrongly describes both human nature and capitalist markets, and he recommends that we
create a competitive and inegalitarian system of education devoted only to the pursuit of

1 of 11

individual benefit, with no regard for the common good. There are errors of fact and
interpretation in the anecdotes he offers to suggest systemic failure. But these are trivial
compared to his portrait of humanity as "homo economicus," motivated solely by our own
interests and acting for our own benefit. More unbelievable is that Coulson expects people to
believe that unregulated capitalism benefits more than a few powerful and well-placed
individuals. While the ability of capitalism to produce riches is beyond question, it also creates
tremendous extremes of wealth and poverty. This is just what the polity seeks to avoid in
education when it establishes and supports common schools.
Coulson's call to privatize education calls into question society's commitment to its
children, denying that there is any collective responsibility. There is certainly no question that
public education currently allows extreme differences in per- pupil expenditures between rich
and poor districts. Even if privatization were not likely to increase this inequality, which it is, it
should be resisted. For while education is a public enterprise, the current inequalities need to be
justified; they are presumed violations of our own sense of justice by which we collectively
commit ourselves to the task of educating the young.
Under the regime of the market to whose discipline Coulson would have us submit,
inequality would no longer require a justification. What would be abandoned in the move to
distribution of education through the market would be the commitment to substantial equality.
The market distributes things unequally, but that is not usually seen as a problem with most
commodities. In a market regime it would cease to be a problem if some few children had the
equivalent of a four star education, while most others went to McSchools. This sort of unequal
distribution is, after all, what markets are supposed to do, and each child would have the school
she "chose," or that her parents "chose" for her. Why should we interfere in this choice? On the
other hand, with schools as an enterprise of the polity, demonstrated inequalities result in
presumptive obligations to improve the conditions of the disadvantaged.
It is this predictable inability to see educational inequity as a problem of justice that should
compel us to reject allowing the market to distribute education. Markets have their proper sphere,
but they should be contained within those areas. Education, because of its role in social
membership and in social adaptation, is not a commodity for the market. Social formation, partly
and properly carried out in the schools, is not purely a matter of individual choice; it is also a
communal enterprise. It is certainly not a mere commodity.
Some consideration of his arguments will convince most of us that Coulson is simply
wrong about both human nature and the operation of unregulated markets. We will then see that
we have every reason to reject his call to erase the "public" from public education.
Human Nature
Coulson portrays us as "homo economicus," individuals whose actions are trades or
investments, and who make decisions based on what action will put the most into our personal
satisfaction accounts. His is a crude utilitarian view, that we always simply strive to maximize
our satisfaction and minimize stress. On this view, society is purely a means to our individual
ends. Our associations are always aimed at getting us what we want; we can have allies, but no
friends. I suggest that this is not true for most of us, who feel distress at the suffering of others,
even those we do not know, will never know, and who can be of no reciprocal use to us. Many of
us are moved by the hunger of children, by what Michael Ignatieff (1984) calls "the needs of
strangers." Indeed, a skillful story teller can move us to tears about the misfortunes and sufferings
of people who have never even lived.
Coulson can reclaim part of his story if he says that we reduce our own stress by relieving
others' suffering, or that it makes us feel good to do good. This does preserve the face of the
utilitarian argument, but not its force, because this turn disconnects the reconstructed
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utilitarianism both from the sociobiological story he tells to support it (we learned to cooperate
only to benefit ourselves in the hunt) and from the competitive conclusions he draws (we should
not collectively concern ourselves about the education of the young, but only look out for our
own children). Once we acknowledge the good feelings that come from helping another, the
utilitarian explanation will not do the work Coulson needs it to do: it is of no use to me to feel
good about helping others, especially strangers or the weak and/or powerless, and there is no
benefit to me to feel distress at the misfortune of others.
Coulson offers the game known as The Prisoner's Dilemma as a metaphor for social life.
His point is that in this game the winners are those pairs who learn to maximize their individual
advantage by cooperating. He offers this as evidence that we cooperate and care for others in the
context of social life because cooperation benefited those who learned it. Further, he argues that
this is still true. However the salient features of that game, those that enable the players to learn
cooperation as the winning strategy, are that (1) each person benefits from "kindness" to the other
and is punished for betrayal, and (2) feedback is immediate and consistent. Neither of these
conditions obtains in everyday life. Quite often there is no reward for our generous deeds;
similarly, there is often no punishment for our selfish ones, which are frequently rewarded. Yet
we see a great deal of generosity, even when it works against our own interests. Some of the
wealthy do vote for just taxation, though that means that their own taxes are increased. In a large
and complex society, "free riders" benefit from the generosity of others combined with their own
stinginess, and yet most people recognize the impulse to generosity.
Even if it is true that sociability originally developed in humans because it aided in
survival on the hunt, it grew beyond that, and did so fairly quickly. The archeological evidence
indicates that our Neanderthal ancestors were already taking care of the sick and the wounded
who could not contribute to the hunt, and were burying their dead with ceremony and ritual that
suggests that they held the deceased individuals as having value that outlived usefulness (Leakey
1992).
Aristotle (1985) recognized the intrinsic value of friendship so much so that the largest
section of the Nichomachean Ethics was devoted to a consideration of its nature and value. His
conclusion was that there was no human life so good that friendship would not improve it. Tom
Green (personal communication) correctly points out that while it is true that having friends is
useful, it is equally true that anyone who selects friends based on their usefulness will have none.
In other words, the usefulness of friends is a consequence of friendship, most likely an inevitable
one, but to value friends for their usefulness is to misunderstand friendship.
Further, Noddings (1984) has made a strong argument that ethical motivations are rooted
strongly in an intuitive and natural care for others. Similarly, Wilson (1993) argued that there is
such a thing as a "moral sense" that is concomitant with human common bonds. He notes that
there are cruelty and greed in the world, but that these are the exceptions. Most people do not
ruthlessly pursue their self interest, but often act in the interests of common good.
This is not, of course, to paint a picture of humanity as closely related to angels -- at least
not just to angels. There is indeed the self-serving and competitive side that Coulson describes.
However, basing any argument, as Coulson does, on "human nature" is risky business. It is easy
to see both selfishness and generosity as potentialities in "human nature"; whether individuals
and societies become in fact selfish or generous may have as much to do with education and
public life as with anything as immutable as is suggested by the term "human nature."
Precisely for this reason, education should remain a function of the polity: it is in the
public discussion about public policy in public space that the balance between personal interest
and common good is properly maintained, or at least sought. There are two reasons why
education must be a public concern: (1) while education is a private good (individuals benefit
from education), it is also a public good (the society benefits from an educated citizenry); and (2)
not all parents will make wise choices for their children, and justice demands that we make
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certain that the education we are providing them is appropriate.
So while it is true that we can act purely to advance our own causes and maximize our own
interests, we can also act in ways that do not benefit us personally. Even if we say that such
action reduces our stress and maximizes happiness, we cannot reduce such action to merely
contributing to survival of the fittest. Further, and significantly, education helps children learn
what they should value in themselves and in others, and this is yet another reason for education to
be an enterprise of the polity.
The Gentle Face of Capitalism
Coulson's next assumption, that unfettered, unregulated capitalism serves the best interests
of all can be more briefly dismissed, as it is an elegantly argued theory that is most effectively
refuted by the facts.
The reality of free-market capitalism is exactly the opposite of Coulson's theoretical
picture, in which everyone benefits from competition. Even theoretically, it should be obvious
that the losers do not benefit. The nature of capitalist markets is that there will be losers as well
as winners. The reality is that small differences in power between one manufacturer or provider
and another accrue so that weaker competitors are eliminated and new ones are stopped in their
tracks. To the extent that we do not see this happening now, it is because of government action to
prevent and break up monopolies. There is ongoing competition in capitalism only because of
government intervention in the market.
Nothing here is meant to attack regulated markets or capitalism. Even while rejecting
Coulson's naive enthusiasm for the world of dogs eating other dogs, it nonetheless seems true, to
paraphrase Churchill, that capitalism is the worst form of economy imaginable, except all the
others that have been tried. However, the marketplace is neither so logical nor benign as Coulson
portrays it. While it may be (and probably is) the case that capitalism increases the GNP and the
average per capita income of those nations that try it, that result can be obtained by doubling the
wealth of the richest quartile and halving the wealth of the poorest quartile. The fact remains that
in unregulated capitalism, the rich do get richer and the poor do get poorer.
Briefly, then, Coulson has failed to justify his recommendation. In the first place, public
education, while imperfect, is hardly the bureaucratic and bumbling nightmare that he assumes;
second, human nature, to the extent that we can say anything about so dubious a construct, is not
so strictly utilitarian as he claims; and third, the unregulated market is anything but benign.
Money and Schools
Coulson's claim that money and educational quality are unrelated suggests that we should
be unconcerned by the great disparities between expenditures for the children of the rich and
expenditures for the children of the poor. Money does matter, and the strongest proof of this fact
is that those who can do so spend it, tell those without it that it makes no difference, and they
fight to keep the privilege.
Like much else in Coulson's argument, however, the claim is not quite completely false. If
we continue to segregate and ghettoize the poor into enclaves where there are no jobs, no social
cohesion, and no hope, adding some money to their schools will make little difference. Taken on
its own terms, then, Coulson's argument suggests that besides investing more in the schools that
serve the poor we must massively invest in the families and communities into which they are
born and in which they are raised. To deprive the children of the poor educational resources on
the grounds that they have so much else working against them is not only unjustified; it is
unconscionable.
Coulson discusses the much-publicized case of Kansas City, where great sums of money
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were spent to improve the physical environment in which children were educated. This is widely
reported to have been a waste of money, and so Coulson reports it. The argument is that, since
the test scores of these schools did not rise, the money spent to improve the schools was wasted.
Yet I strongly suspect that if there were middle-class suburban white children attending school in
decaying and dangerous buildings, and if money were spent to build new schools and equip them
with the sorts of amenities that most white kids take for granted, improved test scores would not
be the measure of success. More likely, a decent school environment would be seen as something
that the children simply deserved.
Those parents who can afford to spend a great deal of money on the education of their
children and who do so are not to be criticized. Parents have primary responsibility for the
well-being of their own children, and parents who could provide a better than average education
for their children but did not do so would not be praiseworthy. What should be censured,
however, is the hypocrisy shown by those who spend large sums on their own children while
telling the parents of children denied such options, "Money does not matter," and working for
public policies to make sure that the poor never get a chance to find out just how false that claim
is. Seeking to provide an advantage for one's own children is not shameful behavior; seeking to
disadvantage others' children is.
The Argument for the Common School
What can we say about the value of education as a shared and public enterprise? I will
argue three points: (1) social life is about more than just personal benefit; (2) as a polity we must
intervene for the good of the children for whom we have a mutual responsibility; and (3) the
view, currently so popular, that "government" is the enemy of "the people," is both false and
pernicious. Finally, I will argue that if these three propositions can be justified, then we have an
obligation, moral and practical, not to just maintain, but to renew and strengthen, our
commitment to education as a public effort of a democratic polity.
Our Social Lives
The first part of my argument is the weakest, in the sense that it will not be at all
convincing to those who find that they do not already have good reason to believe it. In fact, I am
at a loss as to how I might prove that there is intrinsic, not just utilitarian, value to human
association. Coulson's frequent citation of The Economist in defense of his thesis calls to mind
the caricature of economists as people who know the price of everything but the value of nothing.
So it appears here. To see social bonds as merely useful seems to me the saddest view we could
have of our human lot in this world. But that is me; those who find no intrinsic value in human
relations will not be moved by my claim that there is such value.
So in one sense my appeal here is to the already convinced, that is, to those who are
already aware of the intrinsic goodness of human contact and care. The argument goes something
like this: the young of our species can learn that friendship has intrinsic value; but it is also
possible to raise individuals who see others merely as means to their own ends; who see the only
definition of success as the furtherance of one's own individual projects; who believe the truth of
the bumper sticker that proclaims, "He who dies with the most toys wins." Further, it is possible
to raise not just individuals, but whole generations, who have lost the ability to recognize the
value of their fellow human beings. It is, in other words, possible that we will create (or are
already creating) the Benthamite world Coulson describes.
To be reduced to pleasure maximizers in our social relations is to be reduced indeed. It is
to become far less than we are capable of becoming, both individually and collectively. I will put
forth as an empirical claim that this is not yet the case, that we still see a non-utilitarian value in
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human relations and that Coulson is wrong in his description of human nature. Each reader will
need to decide the validity of this claim for him- or herself.
As a thought experiment: would you feel (or have you ever felt) inclined to put flowers on
the grave of a friend, despite the total lack of utility in such an effort? Artificial games like the
Prisoner's Dilemma aside, in real life have you ever gone out of your way on behalf of a stranger?
If your answer is yes, then there is more to your social life than Coulson's account allows. For
while these actions might "reduce stress" or "maximize pleasure," that fact alone disproves the
view that Coulson is arguing, for it shows that our social life is more than can be explained by
the survival value of cooperation in a Darwinian competition for individual survival.
Common Obligations
Even if we agree that individuals occasionally do choose to act without regard to return,
and therefore do not always act rationally regarding pleasure-maximization, does it follow that
there is an obligation to do so? Must we, in other words, take positive actions to protect the
well-being of others? Is there any requirement that we be as compassionate as our Neanderthal
ancestors who bound up the wounds of their companions and nursed them though they could no
longer contribute to the group's hunting success? Specifically, does the polity -- the legally
constituted "we" -- owe protection to children from the effects of market competition in
education? Coulson says no; I disagree. And this is the core of our disagreement.
There is a utilitarian argument in favor of communal care for our children: poorly educated
children will be burdens on the society in the future, and therefore it is in the collective interest to
see to their proper education and nurture. This is probably true, but it is not the sort of argument I
want to make here.
We have a moral and ethical obligation to care for the children in our midst. This is partly
a different sort of utilitarian argument: we are better off to the extent that we make our society a
more decent human community. The point can perhaps be made more forcefully by putting it this
way: what sort of people would not protect their children? What would we say about such a
people if we were not they?
Of course, the issue is not this simple. It is surely not true, as Coulson rightly points out,
that all children need this care from the polity: the vast majority receive this concerned care from
their parents, and quite effectively. However, this fact is not an argument against public schools
for two reasons: (1) the polity has an obligation to see to the well-being of all children, not just
the majority with effective parents; and (2) the common schools were never intended to provide
education only for children whose parents do not do so.
On the first point, no matter how small the minority of children whose parents might not
choose wisely, the question will remain: what do we owe, as a people, to those whose parents do
not? (The percentage of such children might be small, but the number might be distressingly
large. When we consider the number of children who are now abused and/or neglected, and add
the number of children whose parents will lack the skill, knowledge, time, information, or
wisdom to choose wisely, the number of children placed in inadequate or harmful educational
settings could be quite substantial.) Under Coulson's scheme, we owe them nothing -- not even
pity. Their parents made a bad choice, but capitalism must have its losers. Note that there is a
failure here even with respect to Coulson's rather spare sense of justice: the child pays for the
mistakes of the parents. If I choose to purchase an automobile and it turns out to be a lemon,
Coulson can defensibly say to me that I made a bad choice and I will pay for it -- that is the
proper nature of market transactions: caveat emptor. If I choose a school for my daughter, and
that turns out to be a bad choice, Coulson must tell her that I made a bad choice, but that she will
pay for it.
Capitalism is good at providing individuals with incentive to produce things that can be
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sold at a profit. However, it is not at all good at distributing these things evenly. It might even be
said that the function of the market is to distribute those things that cannot be distributed equally
in a manner that appears to be equitable. However, education, at least k-12 education, is not one
of those things.
Coulson's remedy to the inequality in a privatized system is vouchers for the very poorest,
but they will not do. In the first place, this move replaces the educational entitlement that the
polity owes to all children with a market that allows the wealthy to choose and charity for the
poor. At the margins, for those just too "wealthy" to qualify for charity schooling, the choice will
be between spending on schooling or on, for example, housing. Further, even if the system were
created so that schools were required to take all applicants on a first come, first served basis, and
even if schools were required to accept the vouchers as full payment for tuition (and neither of
these attempts at fairness are part of Coulson's plan), all vouchers can accomplish is the
possibility of access. Actually getting into the right school will require that the child have
intelligently chosen her parents such that they can and will exert the effort required to make a
good school choice.
For all Coulson's talk about the right to choose and suffer or enjoy the consequences, the
real question is: "Who gets to choose for the child?"; this is not a case where we can give the
child the choice for him- or herself. And the public policy question here may not be how to
maximize the good obtainable for children whose parents are good choosers; rather the best
policy may be one that aims to minimize the harm to the children whose parents are not good
choosers.
This notion of "good school choice" is itself one that needs to be examined more closely.
What is a "good" school? Given the many possible good ends that schools can serve, there may
be no one answer, and the answers that count individual and personal goods may differ from
those that count social goods. It is the resolution of these issues that Coulson wants to leave to
the market, elevating the personal perspective and eliminating the social one. But in truth, these
two sorts of goods need to be balanced, and the polity is the proper place for that to happen.
On the second point, public schools were never founded on the premise that vast numbers
of individual parents were, or are likely to be, derelict in their duty to care for and educate their
children. The schools in this society are public for quite a different reason: education is also a
social and common good, and therefore it is properly funded by the polity. The polity has an
interest in ensuring that children receive the education that will prepare them for democratic life.
Government: "Them" or "Us"?
Perhaps there is no trend in American life more ominous for our future than the increase in
the number of those who accept one of Coulson's assumptions: that ours is not, and cannot be, a
government of, by, and for the people. There is no commons in Coulson's world, no shared
interests, no mutual commitment. Nothing beyond what I want for myself. Government is not a
means of addressing common concerns and providing for common needs, but a threat to
individual prosperity, a foreign agency that limits individual rights. I can imagine no view of the
relationship between a government and a people more threatening to democracy.
Granted that government, however democratic in form, may disconnect from the people, it
is also possible for the people to reclaim the government and redirect it. Coulson presumes that
government is the enemy, not the servant, of the people, and therefore argues that we should
make no effort to seek a common good through political action. Instead, he tells us, we should
disconnect as fully as possible from all government. This may serve the interest of the most
talented and fortunate, but can hardly be credibly seen to be either just or democratic.
This is the strongest reason to reject the libertarian view that informs Coulson's ungenerous
vision of society: by speaking only of rights, and not at all of responsibilities of membership,
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Coulson argues that society owes protection and assistance to him, but that he owes nothing to
society. The property rights he expects society to enforce for his benefit are absolute and
non-negotiable. His sole interest is in what society can do for him; he denies any responsibility to
do for his society or his fellow citizens. His notion of rights is seriously deficient in that it is
disconnected from membership and the responsibilities that follow therefrom.
Coulson's proposal to improve schools by changing from democratic governance to blind
market forces seems to miss the nature of democratic life. Our schools are perhaps the most
democratic institutions that we have in this society. School boards are locally elected, and are
often easily accessible to their constituents. School budgets in many, if not most, places are voted
on directly by the local residents. There are problems, and there is great inequality based on
community wealth, but the system as a whole remains responsive to democratic control. Further,
the answer to inequities rooted in local power and wealth differentials is certainly not to turn the
system over to the market, given the market's proven record of exacerbating such differentials.
If government is not responsive, we have a remedy: become involved and make it more so.
Government is not the enemy of the people; it is, or it can be, the agent of the people. That is, the
members of the school board are chosen by us from among us. The same is true, in a less
intimate sense, of our state and national government officials. While there is much evidence that
government today has become seriously estranged from the people it is supposed to serve, there
is equally good reason to suspect that this is due at least in part to the withdrawal from public life
-- the polity -- by large numbers of people. Coulson advocates continuing, rather than correcting,
this move to erode the possibilities of democracy by removing a fundamental institution from
democratic governance.
Of all things, we should fear that turning the schools into market institutions is to do that
which is least desirable -- to remove the possibility that the polity could influence the course of
citizenship development.
Education and the Polity
Given that our species has a social life far richer than competition, and given that
democracy fails to the extent that we allow losers in the competition for educational opportunity,
and given that democratic government allows for schools to be directed by the polity in a way
that balances, or tries to balance, the common and the individual good in education, we see that
we have good reason to reject the Coulson proposal to abandon our children to market forces and
those who would profit from their manipulation.
Imagine for a moment a world in which there is profit motive for enticing enrollment, and
the polity no longer had a say in school governance. The schools that would be most able to
attract students, and the most profitable students at that, would be the same schools that currently
do so. They would be the elite and prestigious schools. Continuing to draw students whose
parents are wealthy, sophisticated, and supportive, they would be in a position to trumpet the
"quality" of their program and would continue to attract those parents most willing and able to
make large tuition payments. These schools would not need to compete for large enrollments,
niche marketing to upscale and highly profitable select customers.
There would likely be a second tier of schools, those fastest to find a way to cut costs -McSchools, providing educational junk food to a mass market, trading quality against cost
containment. The paradigm institution might be the Stanley Kaplan Memorial High School,
guaranteeing high SAT scores (or whatever single measure will count most in attracting
customers), but not much in the way of citizenship or literature or critical thinking. The polity
may have good reason to not want to invest in this sort of school. The proper balance between
public and private interest may be right where it is: I can send my child to a Stanley Kaplan
Center if I wish to pay for it, but public funds will not fund it. These mass market schools might
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be expected to generate high profits just as their fast food counterparts do: low wages, high
volume, no frills.
There will be a third group of schools, those who at the beginning of market competition
are the ones with the fewest resources serving the least powerful segments of the community.
These will be the schools that will register the students whose parents, for whatever reason, did
not succeed in the competition for entrance to the winner schools. That is what capitalism is
about: producing losers as well as winners, and more of the former than the latter.
The issue here is whether education, a requirement for democratic citizenship, ought to be
distributed as a commodity, or whether education is in some fundamental way different from
microwave ovens. To ask this question is to answer it: democracy is in no way threatened if some
citizens have inferior microwave ovens, or none at all. That is not so if the market leaves some
children with inferior education. Especially if the inequality results, not out of failure to live up
to presumptive commitments to equality, but out of policies designed to produce and validate
these inequalities.
To repeat, it is not true that the sort of equality of access and quality that democracy
requires exists now. But inequalities of access and quality are now seen to violate our
presumptive commitments. It is exactly this commitment that Coulson asks us to abandon,
assuring us that the market will provide for all. As it does with caviar and urban condominiums,
no doubt.
Finally, this is not an argument against educational choice per se. However, school choice,
if such there be, should be exercised within limits set by the polity (whose collective interests
must be balanced against the individual good). Specifically, every school choice plan should have
to meet two requirements: (1) only schools subject to public control receive public funds; and (2)
all schools that are under public control receive adequate public funding. Given that the public
interest is provided for, and given that the least powerful are protected, some form of educational
choice might be a good thing. Nor is this an argument against the existence of private schools.
However, we should neither abandon the enterprise of public education nor divert public funds to
private schools and profit. We should have higher aspirations for our children, and for ourselves,
than that.
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